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Addressing Social Security’s Solvency While Promoting
High Labor Force Participation
Abstract
A number of proposals and options to address OASI trust-fund solvency have been suggested in 
recent years. The present work attempts to examine solvency-promoting reforms from the
standpoint of economic efficiency — that is, from the perspective of their effect on household 
and societal well-being. Ultimately, we argue that solvency and efficiency should be joint
considerations for policy. We first set up a structural model of household consumption/saving
and retirement choices. We estimate the model’s parameters using Consumer Expenditure 
Survey and Health and Retirement Study data. Then we simulate policy changes. Using the 2017 
Social Security Trustee’s Report, we examine policy changes that could prevent trust fund 
depletion for 75 years or more. In the simulations, payroll tax increases or Social Security benefit
reductions sufficient to ensure solvency have modest effects on household labor supply, though 
they lower lifetime consumption and utility.  Earlier work considered age-targeted payroll tax
changes that could promote longer careers. Here, we examine possible changes to the Social
Security benefit formula — specifically the AIME formula — that could encourage delayed
retirement more straightforwardly. We show that incentivizing an extra one to two years of work
on average might be possible. That would generate substantial new tax revenues, from both 
payroll and income taxes.  Although sacrificed leisure would lead to household utility reductions, 
they are relatively small — comparable to the best alternatives. Comparing the results with
simpler tax and benefit changes, we suggest that promoting longer careers could enlarge the set
of policy options in a useful way.
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I. Introduction 
Policymakers have developed a number of proposals and options to address solvency
concerns about the OASI and DI Trust Funds. Questions arise, however, about the full
spectrum of possible implications of each given proposed policy. This paper focuses on the
potential consequences for economic efficiency of different courses of action. Specifically, we
use a structural economic model to study the likely behavioral responses of households to
various policies, with our interest centering on whether a particular policy encourages
households to work longer or, conversely, to retire earlier. 
The basic idea of this paper is as follows. As a household makes its decision of when to
retire, it should, at its chosen retirement age, perceive the extra remuneration from
working one more month to exactly offset the disutility of lost leisure from delaying
retirement by the same amount. This might seem to imply that a policy change that
encouraged more work would provide little net gain to households. We need, however, to
recognize that existing income and payroll taxes mean a household’s private gain from work
tends to be smaller than the social gain — with the latter being the sum of the personal gain
and the increase in tax revenue for society.1 Put another way, in deciding when to retire, a
household balances its net-of-tax earnings from more work against the benefit of increased
leisure from retirement. Society’s gain if the household works longer is, however, the gross-
of-tax wage. Taxes thus create a wedge that, in turn, leaves scope for encouraging longer
careers to promote efficiency. Extra tax revenues may be generated, and we attempt to assess
how large they might be. 
Our analysis uses a structural model with parameters estimated from HRS data. The
2017 Social Security Trustee’s Report predicts the OASDI trust fund will be depleted by
2034, and an immediate, permanent payroll tax increase of 2.76% (an increase of about
22.26%) or an immediate, permanent benefit reduction of 17% will be required to achieve
full solvency for 75 years. Using round numbers, we simulate a 24% payroll tax increase and
an 18% benefit reduction, accordingly. In the simulations, either policy has a modest effect
on labor supply. We also consider a modification to the indexing formula for calculating the
Social Security benefits. The modification increases incentives to delay retirement.
Simulations show that increases in the average retirement age of 1-2 years are possible, that
corresponding increases in income and payroll tax revenues could cover 1/4 to 1/3 of the
shortfall in the Trustee’s Report, and that utility losses would be less than those from
payroll tax increases with the same revenue enhancement. We examine the distributional
impacts of the 3 approaches as well. The analysis suggests that policies that promote 
This assumes that a household’s access to public goods is independent of the taxes it
pays. 
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longer careers could be a useful component of reforms designed to ensure Social Security’s 
long-term solvency. 
II. Literature 
A large literature studies the effects of Social Security on labor supply (see, for ex-
ample, Feldstein and Liebman [2002]). Here, we are specifically interested in reforms that 
could improve the solvency outlook for Social Security. A structural model allows the study 
of counterfactuals. We use such a model, estimating its parameters from HRS and other 
data (e.g., Gustman and Steinmeier [1986], Rust and Phelan [1997], French [2005]). We 
simulate (i) payroll tax increases and (ii) OASI benefit reductions. We examine impacts 
on labor supply and household well-being. We then turn our attention to (iii) policies 
designed to increase labor force participation. We ask whether they could contribute to 
solvency. A literature on age-dependent taxes suggests targeting lower tax rates at house-
hold with more elastic labor supply (see, for instance, Banks and Diamond [2010]). In 
that vein, several papers consider lowering taxes on labor income as households reach the 
normal age of retirement (e.g., Goda et al [2009], Burtless and Quinn [2002], Laitner and 
Silverman (LS) [2012, 2017]). The present analysis is related to the later work, comparing 
option (iii) with (i)-(ii). 
LS [2012, 2017] study a reform that would raise the payroll tax on young adults 
but lower it on those in their late 50s or early 60s. The idea is to raise the net-of-tax 
remuneration at ages when households reach the margin of retirement. LS [2017] suggest 
that increases in the average retirement age of 1-1.5 years might be possible. However, the 
reform would be elaborate. And, the distributional effects could be substantial. Here, we 
consider a simpler policy. Its potential contribution to Social Security solvency would be 
extra tax revenues from longer work lives. 
III. Model 
We use a structural economic model, with parameters estimated from HRS and linked 
Social Security earnings-record data. 
Each household seeks to adjust its lifetime trajectory of consumption expenditure to 
maximize its lifetime utility, subject to its budget constraints. A household’s basic re-
sources consist of the (net-of-tax) labor earnings of its adult male and female, and Social 
Security benefits. In addition to choosing its trajectory of consumption/saving, a house-
hold picks its retirement age. In this paper, female earnings are taken to be exogenous 
and household retirement is retirement of the male adult. Labor supply is discrete — 
households have latitude for choice on the extensive margin (i.e., retirement age) but not 
the intensive margin (i.e., how many hours per day to work).2 
The economic unit is the household. Numbers of children, age of marriage, and life 
spans are exogenous. We adjust for household composition changes using “equivalent 
adult” indices, with estimated weights (see below). Labor earning profile shapes with re-
spect to experience are exogenous, though they depend upon education (itself taken to 
See, for example, Rust and Phelan [1997, p.786] and Hurd [1996]. 
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be exogenous). As we solve the model for the optimal age of retirement and the opti-
mal lifetime trajectory of household consumption, the analysis determines the age-path 
of household wealth accumulation. The model is homothetic, so that it can be applied 
to households from different birth cohorts: as improvements of technology lead to higher 
wages for more recent cohorts, their consumption and savings tend to rise proportionately, 
and their retirement age tends to remain unchanged. Changes in earnings profile shapes 
(as with rising educational attainments), as well as longer life spans, can, however, affect 
optimal retirement ages. 
The structural model’s framework comes from LS [2012]. Utility (per “equivalent 
adult”) depends upon per capita consumption expenditure, say, xs at (household) age s, 
and per capita leisure, say, s. A household’s utility flow, per equivalent adult, at age s is ⎧ 
]γ¯ /⎨ [fs γ¯ ,  for γ¯ < 1 and  ¯γ = 0,  
us = (1) ⎩ ln(fs) , for γ¯ = 0,  
with 
fs = [xs]α · [ s]1−α , α ∈ (0 , 1) . (2) 
Let the age of retirement be R. Because labor supply is all-or-nothing, we normalize s = 1  
for s < R and s = ¯  > 1 for  s ≥ R. Setting γ ≡ γ¯ · α, we can rewrite (1)-(2) as ⎧ ⎨ [xs]γ /γ , for s < R, 
u(xs , s) =  (3) ⎩ [ω · xs]γ /γ , for s ≥ R, 
where 
αω ≡ [ ]¯ 1−α > 1 . (4) 
If Ns is the number of equivalent adults in the household at age s and Xs total household 
consumption expenditure, a household’s age-s utility flow is 
⎧ 
1 ⎨ · [ Xs ]γ , for s < R,γ Ns 
U(Xs , s) =  (5) ⎩ 1 
γ · [ ωN ·X ss ]γ , for s ≥ R. 
One necessary condition for optimality equates the marginal utility of a dollar spent 
on consumption before and after retirement. Letting XR− be expenditure the instant 
before retirement, we have3 
U1(XR− , R) =  U1(XR , R) . (6) 
3 We use the notation 
U1(X,R) ≡ ∂U(X,R)/∂X . 
3 
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Algebra shows that (6) holds if and only if 
1−γXR = Ω  · XR− where Ω ≡ [ω] 
γ 
. (7) 
A second necessary condition equates the gain from delaying retirement with the loss. 
The gain includes U(XR− , R)dR less the value of resources expended, U1(XR− , R)·XR− dR, 
plus increased Social Security benefits and earnings, U1(XR− , R) · [B (R) · er·R + y(R−)], 
where B(R) is the present value at age 0 of a household’s OASI benefits if it retires at 
age R. Similarly for the losses. We have 
U(XR−, R) − U1(XR− , R) · XR− + U1(XR−, R) · [B (R) · er·R + y(R−)] = 
U(ω · XR, R) − U1(ω · XR, R) · ω · XR . (8) 
Algebra and (6)-(7) enable us to simplify (8) to 
B (R) · er·R + y(R−) 1 − γ 
= · [Ω − 1] . (9) 
XR− γ 
Expression (9), the first-order condition for the optimal retirement age, plays a key 
role throughout the analysis. On the left-hand side, we have the financial gain in Social 
Security benefits and earnings from the marginal year of work, converted to units of utility 
through multiplication by the marginal utility per dollar of consumption at the age of 
retirement. On the right, we have the sacrifice of leisure from the marginal year of work, 
also measured in units of utility. If we make the numerator on the left-hand side larger, 
the household desires to delay its retirement; if we make the denominator larger, marginal 
utility from consumption is lower, so it wishes to retire sooner. Either raising the house-
hold’s current after-tax earnings or increasing the sensitivity of its Social Security benefits 
to its retirement age makes it want to work longer — whereas the higher the household’s 
consumption, the greater its relative valuation of leisure, hence the greater its urge to 
retire. 
Note that our formulation highlights the role of leisure. Retirees have more leisure 
and that may affect not only their well-being but also their intertemporal expenditure 
allocation. A household aggregates its current consumption expenditure and leisure into 
“service flow” fs, which then determines its utility. Specification (2) makes consumption 
expenditure and leisure complementary in the production of services. If households are 
flexible about re-allocating service flows across ages, they will want high consumption 
expenditure during retirement, when it can be combined with high leisure. If, in contrast, 
households are rigid in wanting nearly equal service flows at all ages, they will plan for less 
consumption expenditure after retirement — using higher consumption expenditure during 
pre-retirement years to compensate themselves for limited leisure. A household’s tolerance 
for intertemporal tradeoffs depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1/(1 − 
γ). Marginal condition (6) shows that optimal consumption expenditure will “jump” up 
after retirement if γ ∈ (0 , 1), that is to say if 1/(1 − γ) > 1, but it will jump down if γ < 0, 
which implies 1/(1 − γ) < 1. 
4 
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Our specification enables us to estimate γ and ω — see below. We can then gauge the 
contribution of leisure time to the well-being of retired households. And, the forecasted 
change in consumption at retirement — as dictated by (6) — will affect how much sav-
ing younger households should optimally undertake. Furthermore, the magnitude of the 
change in consumption expenditure at retirement can help to identify the value of γ in the 
estimation. 
Analysis of the complete model is more complicated than one might expect. As a 
household maximizes its lifetime utility with respect to its trajectory of consumption ex-
penditure, it faces a standard, concave problem. We also have a convenient first-order 
∗condition, (9), for the household’s optimal retirement age, say, R . However, the utility-
maximizing retirement age depends on the shape of the household’s lifetime earnings pro-
file. The retirement problem can easily, therefore, be non-concave. For instance, business-
cycle fluctuations or episodic changes in the aggregate economic growth rate, promotions 
gained/or missed, and/or health changes can make a household’s lifetime earnings profile 
choppy. Checking for local maxima, we find that multiple critical points do arise in some 
cases. When they do, we attempt to evaluate all and pick the one generating the highest 
lifetime utility. 
IV. Data and Estimation 
Our parameter estimates come from LS [2017], as reproduced in Table 1. We have 
a 3-equation system. For the first equation, we use a synthetic panel from the consumer 
expenditure survey (CEX) 1984-2001 to estimate the parameters 
r − ρ K γ( 1 ,  2 ,  3 ,  4) ≡ , ξS , ξ  , · ln(ω) , (10) 1 − γ 1 − γ 
where ρ is the household subjective discount rate, r is the interest rate, ξS is the equivalent 
Kadult consumption weight for a spouse and ξ is the same for a child, and ω is as in (7). 
Appendix 1 provides details (see also LS [2012]). 
For the second and third regression equations, we use HRS demographic and linked 
Social Security earnings record data. We use panel data 1992-2014 from the original HRS 
cohort, which was age 51-61 in 1992. We use once-married households that are married in 
1992. Both spouses have linked Social Security earnings histories. We estimate separate 
earnings dynamics equations for men and for women, dividing the samples into 4 different 
educational groups (less than high school, high school, some college, and college/more). 
We use the latter equations to impute earnings above the Social Security cap. We carry 
estimated “individual effects” from the earnings equations to the structural model of house-
hold behavior. The HRS survey data supplies detailed demographic information for each 
household. In addition to the linked earnings records, the HRS is well-known for its net-
worth data, which includes not only financial assets and housing equity, but also detailed 
treatment of IRAs, defined benefit pension accounts, and estimates of the present value of 
defined benefit pension rights. (Our analysis of networth uses data from 1992 and excludes 
households already retired at that date.) 
We solve each household’s dynamic optimization problem using the parameters from 
(10). Our second regression equation relates a household’s optimal retirement age to the 
5 
value of γ. Call the estimate of the latter γR . The third regression equation solves for 
the optimal retirement age but uses it to determine the household’s 1992 networth. The 
latter is its dependent variable, leading to an alternative estimate of γ, which  we  call  
γA . In theory, we should find γR = γA . In practice, they indeed are not significantly 
different. Our “stage-2” estimation imposes γ = γR = γA (with our 3-equation system 
now over-identified). This paper uses the parameter estimates from Table 1, column 2. 
We assume the gross-of-tax real interest rate is 5%/yr. This reflects the marginal 
product of physical capital in the U.S. economy (see Laitner and Silverman [2005]).4 For 
simplicity, we assume all men die at age 74 and all women at 80. 
Interpretation. Consider the parameter estimates of Table 1, column 2. 
As noted in the Appendix, optimal pre-retirement life-cycle consumption per equiv-
alent adult rises at rate  1 = (r − ρ)/(1 − γ). With  1 = 0.0272, in the 40 years from, 
say, age 22 to 62, it would, therefore, nearly triple (presumably manifested, in practice, in 
larger living space, fancier automobiles, etc.). 
The parameters  2 = 0.3351 and  3 = 0.3373 imply that a household allocates more 
consumption expenditure to years with 2 adults than 1, and more to periods with resident 
children. However, estimates of both  2 and  3 are significantly less than 1 — implying 
substantial economies of scale in household size.5 
The parameter  4 is novel to our modeling specification. Its magnitude implies that 
a household will plan to reduce its consumption expenditure after retirement by about 
9.2%. In other words, households will want to compensate themselves for less leisure prior 
to retirement with higher consumption spending. However, the effect seems modest.6 
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), 1/(1 − γ), is about 0.82. This is 
within the standard range in the literature, though at the range’s higher end (LS [2012]). 
It implies that households are willing to shift their consumption spending fairly vigorously 
in response to, for instance, interest rate changes. 
Features of the Analysis. One innovation of our approach is the nonseparability of its 
utility function in consumption and leisure. As described above, that enables us to study 
the possible complementarities of consumption and leisure, including potential implications 
of abrupt consumption changes at retirement. Second, this paper’s model is fully identified 
on the basis of either retirement or networth data. Thus, Table 1, column 1, can estimate 
the key IES parameter separately from each and test for equality. 
Finally, noting potential problems with local maxima in the solution for the optimal 
retirement age, we employ an estimation algorithm that checks for the optimal retirement 
age in each 1-year interval for ages 50-74. In the estimation, calculations find local maxima 
in 5-10% of the cases. 
4 This is a compromise choice: in practice, bank accounts and money market funds tend 
to pay less than 5%/yr; common stocks and mortgages more; and, credit card debt even 
more. 
5 See the comparisons with the literature in LS [2012], for example. 
6 Earlier papers in the literature suggested much steeper declines after retirement, but 
the estimates in Table 1 resemble more recent results — see the discussion in LS [2012]. 
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Table 1. Structural Model Regression Outcomes: 
Estimated Parameter (Std. Error/T-Stat.) 
variable Stage 1 Stage 2 
r−ρ 1 = 1−γ 0.0264
∗∗∗ 
(0.0008/34.5727) 
0.0272∗∗∗ 
(0.0006/41.9929) 
 = ξS 2 0.3351∗∗∗ 
(0.0523/6.4108) 
0.3351∗∗∗ 
(0.0491/6.8244) 
 = ξK 3 0.3372∗∗∗ 
(0.0181/18.6690) 
0.3373∗∗∗ 
(0.0165/20.4231) 
γ 4 = · ln(ω)1−γ -0.0831∗∗ 
(0.0370/-2.2482) 
-0.0830∗∗∗ 
(0.0218/-3.8153) 
γ NA -0.2171∗∗∗ 
(0.0245/-8.8703) 
γR -0.2179∗ 
(0.1150/-1.8940) 
NA 
γA -0.0906∗∗ 
(0.0449/-2.0179) 
NA 
Observations 4033 4033 
Criterion S(θ ,  Vˆ ) 0.0000 11.6044 
Wald Test of Hypothesis γR = γA 
γR − γA -0.1273 
(0.0816/-1.5595) 
NA 
Source: see text. Significant ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1% level. 
V. Policy 
As previewed in the introduction, the Social Security Trustee’s Report 2017 projects 
that restoring Trust Fund solvency would require an immediate, permanent payroll tax 
increase of about 24%, an immediate, permanent cut in Social Security benefits of about 
18%, or some combination of the two. This section simulates changes of these types. We 
are especially interested in the model’s forecasted labor-supply reactions and the effects 
on household well-being. 
In our simulations, household demographics and lifetime earnings profile shapes are as 
in the HRS data, as are interest rates. We assume a gross-of-tax real interest rate of 5%/yr. 
Our simulations assume that new taxes or benefits apply to HRS couples throughout their 
7 
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lives. We do not study transitions for the economy between balanced growth paths. Rather, 
we compare different long-run growth paths. Although the model is partial equilibrium in 
nature — taking wages and interest rates as exogenous — it describes household actions in 
terms of optimizing lifetime saving/consumption profiles and (male) retirement age; thus, 
it can capture household responses to policy changes. 
Payroll Taxes. Table 2 examines payroll tax increases. We consider increases of 6, 8, 
12, 16, and 24% of the 2015 OASI tax. In each simulation, we add that amount to the 
payroll tax.7 The simulations leave the Social Security earnings cap and benefit formula 
at historical levels. Until the separate section on distributional effects below, we focus on 
the top 5 rows of the table. 
To develop intuitions, consider (9). Table-2 policies leave the condition’s right-hand 
side unchanged. On the left, OASI benefits are unchanged, but y(R−), net-of-tax earnings 
just prior to retirement, decreases. If a household’s total lifetime resources decreased by 
the percent of the tax increase — and B (R) · er·R is small — household consumption as 
retirement approaches, XR−, would drop the same percentage, and R would remain the  
same. In other words, the income and substitution effects of the tax increase would exactly 
counterbalance one another. In practice, however, B (R) · er·R is positive and y(R−) will 
drop less in percentage than the tax increase when the Social Security cap is binding. In 
any case, the cap and unchanged OASI benefits make the change in XR− smaller than the 
percent payroll tax change. Thus, we expect the change in R to be near, but not exactly 
equal to, 0. 
Table 2 bears the intuitions out. If we raise the payroll tax by 24%, the average 
retirement age changes only about 1.5 months (i.e., 13% of a year). Although the tax 
increase is about 2.5%, earnings above the OASI cap and Social Security benefits are 
unaffected; so, the lifetime profile of per capita (adult) consumption only declines by 2%. 
OASI Benefits. Table 3 considers reductions of 4.5, 6, 9, 12, and 18% in OASI benefits. 
As above, we first concentrate on the top 5 rows of the table. 
Again, consider (9). The right-hand side is unchanged. On the left, B (R) · er·R will 
decrease because benefits are smaller. In general, however, the B (R) term is small — see 
below. The term y(R−) is unaffected. Smaller OASI benefits reduce a household’s lifetime 
resources, so XR− will fall. Thus, households should tend to choose less leisure, causing R 
to increase. In this case, we have an almost pure income effect. 
Though Table 3 bears out the predicted sign of the change in R, the magnitude of 
the change is relatively small. Without an offsetting substitution effect, we might expect 
the (negative) income effect to produce a hefty decline in the average retirement age. 
One explanation for the modest effect that we find is that OASI benefits arrive late in a 
household’s life; hence, in present value terms, their impact is smaller than otherwise. The 
Social Security system operates on a pay–as–you–go basis, with payroll taxes from workers 
contemporaneously funding benefits to retirees. For a household, in contrast to the Social 
Security system, taxes precede benefits. With a 5%/yr gross interest rate, the difference 
For the fifth row of Table 2, for example, we add 0.106 × 0.24 = 0.02544 to each year’s 
payroll tax rate. Since the payroll tax was lower early in the careers of the HRS cohort, 
the percentage changes in the simulations were higher at those ages. 
8 
7 
Table 2. Simulated Change in Average Retirement Age 
after Payroll Tax Increase 
Payroll Tax 
Change 
(%) 
Change 
Retirement 
Age (Yrs) 
Change 
Consumption 
Per Capita (%) 
Change 
Utility 
(%) 
Change 
OASI 
Benefit (%) 
All Once-Married Couples (1634 Observations) 
6.00 -0.03 -0.51 -0.11 -0.01 
8.00 -0.04 -0.68 -0.14 -0.01 
12.00 -0.07 -1.02 -0.22 -0.02 
16.00 -0.09 -1.36 -0.29 -0.03 
24.00 -0.13 -2.04 -0.44 -0.05 
Couples with High School Educated Male (565 Observations) 
6.00 -0.03 -0.54 -0.11 -0.01 
8.00 -0.04 -0.72 -0.15 -0.01 
12.00 -0.08 -1.08 -0.23 -0.02 
16.00 -0.09 -1.44 -0.31 -0.02 
24.00 -0.14 -2.16 -0.46 -0.03 
Couples with College Educated Male (429 Observations) 
6.00 -0.03 -0.42 -0.09 -0.02 
8.00 -0.04 -0.56 -0.12 -0.02 
12.00 -0.06 -0.84 -0.18 -0.03 
16.00 -0.08 -1.12 -0.24 -0.04 
24.00 -0.12 -1.68 -0.36 -0.07 
Source: see text. Simulations based on the original HRS cohort in all cases. 
in timing is significant. The Trustee’s Report shows an OASI benefit cut of 18% helps the 
Social Security Trust Fund roughly as much as a payroll tax increase of 24%, but from a 
household’s perspective the two policies are quite different. 
A comparison of the consumption and utility changes in Tables 2-3 shows that the 
loss from a 24% tax increase is about twice that of an 18% benefit reduction. That would 
be consistent with the fact that that the benefit reduction induces virtually no distorting 
substitution effect and/or that the timing difference for the 2 policies makes the second 
less onerous. 
Summary of Tables 2-3. Our model allows us to study household reactions to policy 
changes, as labor supply and consumption decisions are determined by utility-maximizing 
behavior. In effect, we do “dynamic,” as opposed to “static scoring.” For policies of the 
magnitude needed to restore Trust Fund solvency, however, household reactions evident in 
both Tables 2 and 3 turn out to be modest. 
That does not necessarily imply that underlying economic inefficiencies are small. In 
(9), the wedge between gross and net earnings created by OASI payroll and federal income 
9 
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Table 3. Simulated Change in Average Retirement Age 
after OASI Beneft Decrease 
OASI Benefit 
Change 
(%) 
Change 
Retirement 
Age (Yrs) 
Change 
Consumption 
Per Capita (%) 
Change 
Utility 
(%) 
Change 
OASI 
Benefit (%) 
All Once-Married Couples (1634 Observations) 
4.50 0.02 -0.26 -0.06 -4.50 
6.00 0.02 -0.34 -0.08 -6.00 
9.00 0.03 -0.51 -0.11 -9.00 
12.00 0.04 -0.68 -0.15 -12.00 
18.00 0.07 -1.02 -0.23 -18.00 
Couples with High School Educated Male (565 Observations) 
4.50 0.02 -0.26 -0.06 -4.50 
6.00 0.03 -0.34 -0.08 -6.00 
9.00 0.04 -0.52 -0.12 -9.00 
12.00 0.05 -0.69 -0.16 -12.00 
18.00 0.08 -1.03 -0.23 -18.00 
Couples with College Educated Male (429 Observations) 
4.50 0.00 -0.23 -0.05 -4.50 
6.00 0.01 -0.31 -0.07 -6.00 
9.00 0.01 -0.46 -0.10 -9.00 
12.00 0.01 -0.61 -0.14 -12.00 
18.00 0.03 -0.91 -0.20 -18.00 
Source: see text. Simulations based on the original HRS cohort in all cases. 
taxes together can easily be 25% or more. Although the B (R) · er·R term could provide a 
counterbalance, in the examples it does not: in our baseline simulation utilizing all couples, 
the average B (R) · er·R is $616, whereas the average y(R−) is $19,250, and the average 
tax wedge is $7113 (all 3 measured in 1984 dollars). 
Retirement Incentives Within Social Security. This section examines the OASI work in-
centive term from (9), B (R) · er·R , in more detail. The next section then suggests a third 
policy for bolstering revenues for the OASI trust fund. 
In principle, the Social Security benefit formula encourages labor-force participation. 
Consider an individual’s benefit calculation, say, in the year 2000. The full retirement 
age was 65. The individual’s “indexing year” is the year he/she turned 60. Create a 
vector of earnings for the individual. For ages past 60, include current earnings, up to the 
year’s Social Security cap. For each earlier age s, multiply earnings (up to that year’s cap) 
by the average Social Security wage in the indexing year divided by the average Social 
Security wage in year the individual was age s. Then select the highest 35 elements in the 
vector, sum them, and divide by 35 × 12. That yields the individual’s “average indexed 
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 monthly earnings” (AIME). Apply the Social Security system benefit formula to the AIME. 
Although the benefit formula is progressive, it is increasing in the AIME. A longer career 
provides more elements from which to select the top 35. Hence, there is an incentive to 
work longer. 
In fact, the latter incentive will tend to be weak for many households. Recall, for 
instance, the dollar values at the end of the last section. An important reason for the weak 
effect is the indexing process. The scaling factor in the indexing procedure reflects the 
growth of nominal wages — in other words, both inflation and TFP advances. In practice, 
the magnitude of the re-scaling tends to be large. For example, the factor applied to 1951 
earnings for an individual turning 60 in 1991 was about 7.5. Given indexation, a male HRS 
lifetime earnings profile tends to resemble the solid curve in Diagram 1. It rises at early 
ages, reflecting accumulation of experiential human capital. After reaching a peak, it falls, 
perhaps due to declining health status. A household starting work at 22 and contemplating 
retirement at 62, for illustration, has 40 years of earnings. The household could exclude 5 
years in computing its AIME. In the diagram, the household would drop earnings for ages 
22-26. If the household considered delaying retirement to age 63, it could also drop y(27), 
using y(63) as a replacement. But, in the pictured case, the gain to the AIME from the 
last step would be modest. 
Promoting Longer Careers. Table 4 examines the effect of eliminating indexing. Begin 
with the table’s top panel. 
As we eliminate indexation, we switch to the dashed curve in Diagram 1. It is much 
steeper. If our individual above considers working one more year after age 62, the contri-
bution to his/her AIME will be a number of times larger. On the other hand, the level 
of everyone’s AIME will be considerably smaller because the dashed curve is lower at all 
ages before 60. Thus, our simulations multiply all earnings by a constant, say, z, that  pre-
serves the average AIME from before — without changing proportionate incentives from 
the dashed curve. 
The retirement-age outcomes from removing indexation in Table 4 are much larger 
than what we find in Tables 2-3. In row 1, Table 4, for example, removing indexation delays 
retirement by an average of 1.27 years. In row 2, we not only discontinue indexation but also 
let households count each year’s earnings for ages ≥ 60 twice (that is to say, households can 
include each such earnings figure twice in the vector from which they choose the highest 35 
values). The corresponding increase in the optimal retirement age is 1.57 years. LS [2017] 
considers raising the payroll tax prior to age 54 and eliminating it thereafter. Here, we 
attain the similar results, or greater, with a simpler-to-execute change. 
Looking at columns 2-4 of Table 4, we see that removing indexation raises per capita 
consumption. A year of extra work might be thought to represent an increase of lifetime 
earnings of about 2.5%. However, a household’s lifetime resources are less affected be-
cause of unchanged Social Security benefits and spousal earnings. Moreover, earnings near 
retirement are smaller in present value terms than those from earlier work. Finally, our 
non-separable utility function causes households to devote extra consumption to years of 
work, leaving less for the life-long average. Thus, the actual increase in consumption is an 
order of magnitude less. The change in utility is slightly negative, reflecting lost leisure. 
Looking more closely, the average B (R) · er·R term (recall (9)) rises from $616 (1984 
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dollars) for the simulation of row 1 if we include indexation to $2753 without, and to $3670 
if we allow double counting of earnings past age 60. Recalling that the annual tax wedge 
is about $7100, the offset from the OASI incentive reaches 50-60%. 
In summary, changing the way we compute the AIME could incentivize longer careers. 
Average increases in the retirement age of 1-1.6 years or more seem possible. 
Table 4. Simulated Change in Average Retirement Age 
after Removing Indexing from the AIME Formula 
Index 
Formula 
Change 
Change 
Retirement 
Age (Yrs) 
Change 
Consumption 
Per Capita (%) 
Change 
Utility 
(%) 
Change 
OASI 
Benefit (%) 
All Once-Married Couples (1634 Observations) 
Stop Indexing 
Earnings Before 60 1.27 0.25 -0.06 0.00 
Stop Indexing 
& Double Count 
Earnings after 60 
1.57 0.26 -0.08 0.00 
Couples with High School Educated Male (565 Observations) 
Stop Indexing 
Earnings Before 60 1.36 0.18 -0.08 -2.28 
Stop Indexing 
& Double Count 
Earnings after 60 
1.70 0.15 -0.12 -3.39 
Couples with College Educated Male (429 Observations) 
Stop Indexing 
Earnings Before 60 0.83 0.31 -0.01 4.29 
Stop Indexing 
& Double Count 
Earnings after 60 
1.31 0.37 -0.02 6.19 
Source: see text. Simulations based on the original HRS cohort in all cases. 
Potential Contributions to Trust Fund Solvency. This section attempts to relate Table 4 
to the OASI Trust Fund’s solvency. Our analysis rests heavily on HRS data, which comes 
from a narrow birth cohort. Thus, computing effects on aggregative government costs and 
revenues requires approximations. 
Our calculations work as follows. We first derive an approximation of total annual 
Social Security benefits. Assuming an average (male) retirement age of 63, we sum current-
year OASI benefits for current year retirees, second-year benefits for the same de-trended 
by annual productivity and work-hours growth, third-year benefits de-trended twice, etc.8 
In Maddison [1991], the U.S. average change in work hours is 1.3%/yr, and GDP per 
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The ratio of OASI and federal income taxes if current retirees work an additional year, 
divided by the summed benefits, is 0.0370. Our back-of-the-envelope tax-revenue gains, 
as a fraction of current benefits, come from the product of the preceding ratio and the 
simulated change in the retirement age from Table 4, column 1, top panel. The changes 
are then 4.7% and 5.8%. In other words, the extra tax revenues seem large enough to cover 
from one-quarter to one-third of the current trust fund shortfall.9 
Efficiency. Our earlier discussion suggests that existing tax wedges tend to lead to re-
tirement ages lower than the societal optimum. Table 4 allows us to begin to gauge the 
possible gains from reforms designed explicitly to encourage longer careers. 
Evidently the reform of row 1 in the top panel of Table 4 could increase (total) tax 
revenues enough to cover slightly nmore than 1/4 of the OASI trust fund’s shortfall. The 
double-counting reform of row 2 could cover slightly less than 1/3. Comparing column-3 
average household utility losses with rows 1-2 at the top of Table 3, we see they are the 
same. The policy changes in Table 3, as noted, are almost purely income-effect driven. 
That is to say, they correspond to lump-sum changes in transfer payments. Thus, the 
policies in Table 4 match the latter high standard of efficiency. 
Discussion. A number of assumptions are implicit in our analysis, as follows. 
The model focuses on household incentives. Yet, households are assumed to begin 
their careers immediately after schooling. For labor supply, only retirement choice is 
endogenous. Foregoing indexation in the derivation of the AIME would de-emphasize 
early-career earnings, possibly encouraging later entry into the labor force. However, even 
non-indexed earnings profiles rise appreciably at first — reflecting strong productivity gains 
from one-the-job experience. An early start in the labor force gives a long payoff for this 
human capital. In mid career, on the other hand, firm-specific human capital can be lost 
in changing jobs, and skills may depreciate rapidly during gaps in employment. Thus, the 
model’s concentration on the age of retirement alone has justification. 
A pension determining retirement benefits from the last year of work prior to retire-
ment alone would risk vulnerability to manipulation: an employer could promise a very 
high ending salary in return for worker concessions at earlier ages. The Social Security 
system essentially uses a 35-year average of earnings in computing the AIME, however, 
and the model does not change that. 
A fundamental issue is that our simulations disregard disability (though the estimation 
in Table 1 does make corrections for this (LS [2017])). LS [2012, tab.3] find that HRS self 
reports of disability explain about 7-15% of labor force separations through the average 
age of retirement. The longer careers in Table 4 apply only to the remainder of the work 
force. 
hour is 1.9%/yr, for 1950-1989. All computations utilize our simple mortality assumptions: 
males die at 74, and females at 80. 
Many of the extra tax revenues from the policies in Table 4 would accrue through 
the federal income tax. We are assuming an arrangement could be worked out to route 
the new revenues to the Social Security trust funds. Precedents include the Greenspan 
Commission arrangements in the early 1980s and Bush-era Payroll Holiday arrangements 
in the early 2000s. 
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Implementation of a reform is another important subject. New workers could be ini-
tiated into a Social Security program without indexation. But, the benefits for system 
solvency would not then begin to emerge until their retirement. The same difficulty would 
apply to benefit reductions if workers already in the the labor force were exempt from sys-
tem changes. Tax reforms applied only to new workers, in contrast, would have immediate 
benefits for program solvency. As stated above, all of this paper’s analysis compares new 
and old “steady states,” sidestepping transitions between policy regimes. 
Finally, the distributional impact of any given reform is of interest as well. The next 
section turns to this issue. 
Distributional Effects of Reform. Tables 2-4 consider separately the impacts on couples 
with males having high school and college educations. 
Table 2 shows the effect of a payroll tax increase is slightly stronger for households in 
the high school education group. They have slightly longer careers (though they retire at 
slightly earlier ages), their earnings are more level throughout their careers, and they are 
less likely to be subject to the payroll-tax cap.10 
Table 3 shows the high school educated are more strongly affected by uniform Social 
Security benefit reductions. This reflects the progressivity of the benefit structure, with 
lower-earners deriving a larger share of their lifetime resources from OASI benefits. 
The most interesting distributional outcomes arise in Table 4. With longer, flatter 
lifetime earnings trajectories, the high school educated have less to gain from removing 
indexation. Since we (uniformly) re-scale AIME’s to hold them constant, on average, after 
removing indexation, in the end the (average) Social Security benefits of the high school 
educated fall 2-3.5%, whereas the college educated enjoy an increase of 4-6%. In terms 
of utility, the college educated have negligible losses, whereas the high school educated 
have declines between those of Tables 2-3. With higher overall taxes, the contribution to 
government revenues from the college educated group, on the other hand, is larger. 
VI. Conclusion 
We construct a structural economic model and use HRS and CEX data to estimate 
its parameters. Then we simulate 3 policies designed to contribute to OASI Trust Fund 
solvency. 
Comparing payroll tax increases to Social Security benefit reductions, neither has a 
large impact on household retirement ages. The disutility of the benefit reduction case 
seems lower, but that is partly because our analysis compares long-run balanced growth 
paths rather than emphasizing transitions after policy changes. Moreover, if the Social 
Security system has benefits beyond the scope of the model — such as providing economy-
wide annuitization and lessening pressure on other social support programs — reducing 
the scope of the present Social Security system may not be attractive. 
Our main innovation is to consider a third option, of encouraging longer careers. 
In this paper, we examine a straightforward change in the indexation formula used for 
The OASI benefit column may seem an anomaly, showing larger effects for the college 
educated. However, the shorter careers and relatively high late-in-career earnings of the 
college educated make this possible. And, all of the percentages in column 4 are small. 
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computing the AIME. Such a reform would neither lower Social Security benefits nor raise 
tax rates. Its efficiency (in terms of household utility losses) seems comparable to lump-
sum tax and transfer policies — normally considered the premier standard. Simulations 
show that encouraging longer careers could substantially enhance government revenues — 
providing an additional option for policymakers’ planning. 
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Appendix 1 
If Nis is the number of equivalent adults for household i at age s, set  
ln(Nis) ≈ 0 +  Nis − 1 =  χS · ξS + χK · ξK , (A1)is is 
where χS is the indicator function for presence of a spouse at age s, ξS is the equivalent is 
adult weight for a spouse, χK is the number of kids in the household, and ξK is the is 
equivalent adult weight per kid. From the household “Euler equation,” 
Xi,s+1 Xis 
1−γ= · e r−ρ . (A2)
Ni,s+1 Nis 
And, from (7), 
1−γXiR = [ω] 
γ · Xi,R−1 , (A3) 
where s = R is the first age s when the household is retired. Assume Nis does not change 
in the year of retirement. Then combining (A1)-(A3), we have 
Δ ln(Xis) ≡ ln(Xi,s+1) − ln(Xis) 
r − ρ 
= + ln(Ni,s+1 − ln(Nis)1 − γ 
r − ρ ξS · ΔχS + ξK · ΔχK if s = R + 1is is= + γ1 − γ 1−γ · ln(ω) · ΔχisR if s = R + 1  
r − ρ γ 
= + ξS · ΔχSis + ξK · ΔχKis + · ln(ω) · ΔχRis , (A4)1 − γ 1 − γ 
where χR is the indicator function for retirement, and where we have used (A2) in the is 
second line. 
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